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WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE*
Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerationst
In the first issue of this Quarterly, the editors declared:
We expect LAW IN TRANSITION QUARTERLY will con-
tinue to treat those "constitutional powers of the people" -
e.g., equal protection, free speech and assembly, due process of
law . . . - all of which concern everyone interested in the juris-
prudential problems of modern democratic society.'
In keeping with its title, Law In Transition Quarterly also
expected to treat these powers in a condition of change. This article
is right in line with that expectation. Our purpose is to outline a
proposal concerned with the academic freedom of students, and ulti-
mately to suggest that at least certain aspects of that freedom should
and shall receive constitutional protection. In the course of the article,
however, it will become clear that this is a rough outline, a specula-
tive venture readily subject to challenge. Indeed, even the suggestion
that academic freedom may in any form be applicable to students,
rather than only to teachers, has recently again been said to make no
sense whatever. 2 Nevertheless, it is time to make a beginning if only to
stimulate further reflection on a subject which, as we hope to show, is
not without significance to a modern democratic society.
The article is organized as follows. First, a brief review of how
courts have treated (or maltreated) student academic freedom. Sec-
ond, an attempt to demonstrate why the general legal tradition re-
specting student rights is no longer relevant. Third, a tentative state-
ment of a system of student academic freedom, and an attempt to
ground that system in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
*Professor of Law, Duke University. Senior Fellow, Yale Law School,
1964-65.
tA companion piece concerning the procedure followed in disciplining
students appears in 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 368 (1963), Procedural Due Process
and State University Students.
11 LAW IN TRANSITION Q. ii (1964).
2See Hook, Freedom to Learn But Not to Riot, N.Y. Times Magazine
p. 8, Jan. 3, 1965.
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I. Suffer the Little Children:
As one surveys the results of earlier attempts by students to
secure their legal protection from arbitrary dismissal,3 he is struck by
the expressive unconcern of the courts. This, for instance, is how the
Illinois Supreme Court responded in 1891, to a student's claim that
his failure to be excused from attending chapel at the state university
did not justify his dismissal:
By voluntarily entering the university, or being placed there
by those having the right to control him, he necessarily surren-
ders very many of his individual rights. How his time shall be
occupied; what his habits shall be; his general deportment; that
he shall not visit certain places; his hours of study and recrea-
3A partial bibliography of materials treating various aspects of student
academic freedom, due process, and equal protection follows: BAKKEN, THE
LEGAL BASIS FOR COLLEGE STUDENT PERSONNEL WORK (Student Personnel
Series No. 2, 1961); BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW (1961); Blackwell, Can a
Student Be Expelled Without Due Process?, COLLEGE AND UNIv. 31 (1961);
Blackwell, The Maintenance of Law and Order on the Campus, COLLEGE AND
UNIv. 27 (1959); Byse, Procedures in Student Dismissal Proceedings: Law and
Policy (Proceedings 170-87, 44th Anniv. Conf. Nat'l Ass'n of Student Person-
nel Administrators, 1962); Commager, The University and Freedom:
"Lehrfreiheit" and "Lernfreiheit," 34 J. HIGHER EDUc. 361 (1963); Hook,
Freedom to Learn But Not to Riot, N. Y. Times Mag., Jan. 3, 1965, p. 8;
Jacobson, The Expulsion of Students and Due Process of Law, 34 J. HIGHER
EDUc. 250 (1963); Johnson, The Constitutional Rights of College Students, 42
TEXAS L. REv. 344 (1964); In Loco Parentis (Nat'l Student Ass'n, Phil.,(Johnson ed.) 1962); Monypenny, Toward a Standard for Student Academic
Freedom, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 625 (1963); Murphy, Educational
Freedom in the Courts, 49 A.A.U.P. BULL. 39 (1963); Parker, Some Legal
Implications for Personnel Officers, 24 J. NAT'L Ass'N OF WOMEN DEANS AND
COUNSELORS 198 (1961); Pollitt, Campus Censorship: Statutes Barring Speak-
ers from State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L. REv. 179 (1963); Seavey,
Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REV. 1406 (1957); Van
Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 368 (1963); Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Univer-
sities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1963);
Williamson, Do Students Have Academic Freedom?, COLLEGE AND UNIV. 466
(1964); Williamson, Students' Academic Freedom, EDUc. RECORD 214 (July,
1963); Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom to the Berkeley Div. of
the Univ. of Calif. Academic Senate (publ. in Notice of Meeting by Hutson,
Secry., Jan. 5, 1965); Note, Private Government on the Campus - Judicial
Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963); Note, Expulsion of
College and Professional Students - Rights and Remedies, 38 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 174 (1963); Note, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary
Proceedings, 1962 ILL. L.F. 438; Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 903 (1958); 55 AM. JUR.
Universities and Colleges; 14 C.J.S. Colleges and Universities; Statement on
Faculty Responsibility for the Academic Freedom of Students, 50 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 254 (1964); National Student Association, Codification of Policy
(1961); ACLU, Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges
and Universities (1961), reprinted in 48 A.A.U.P. BULL. 110 (1962). See
generally, Parsons, Rights and Responsibilities of College Students, an anno-
tated bibliography of materials compiled by the College Student Personnel
Institute (Claremont, Calif., 1962).
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tion, - in all these matters, and many others, he must yield
obedience to those who, for the time being, are his masters. . . .'
Here, in a 1917 opinion by a New York Court was the judicial
response refusing reinstatement of a student after dismissal from a
university for having participated in off campus, non-university politi-
cal meetings in which he decried World War I as a "dollar war," and
in which he opposed the draft:
[N]ot the least important of the functions of a school or college
has been to instil and sink deep in the minds of its students the
love of truth and the love of country. Is such conduct as that of
the plaintiff calculated to make it more difficult for the defendant
University to inculcate patriotism in those of its student members
- if there be such unfortunates - who are without it? Does
language of the sort used by the plaintiff at public meetings -
for I assume that he is in substance correctly quoted - make
him a real or potential menace to the morale of the defendant's
student body and a blot on the good name of the famous and
honored University whose degree he seeks?5
Universities, as conceived by these and other state courts, were
not unique institutions whose special function it is to provide educa-
tional opportunities. Rather, they were general function agencies
which combined the responsibilities of the church, the civil and
criminal law, and the home, in the rearing of the young. They were, in
short, surrogate parents and accordingly endowed with vast discre-
tion:
As to the mental training, moral and physical discipline, and
welfare of the pupils, college authorities stand in loco parentis
4North v. Board of Trustees, 137 Ill. 296, 306, 27 N.E. 54, 56 (1891).
See also Carr v. St. John's Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. 1962)(reinstatement refused after dismissal for participating as witnesses in a non-
Catholic wedding), commented on in 8 S.D.L. REV. 117 (1963); 37 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1164 (1962); 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 215 (1962); People ex rel. O'Sullivan
v. New York Law School, 22 N.Y.Supp. 663 (1893) (mandamus refused for
student denied his law degree for refusing to attend commencement where a
Bishop would preside and conduct religious services).5Samson v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 150-51, 167 N.Y.
Supp. 202, 205 (1917). See also Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r, 271
F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959) (reinstatement denied following suspension for writing
inflammatory letters critical of the administration); Due v. Florida A.&M. Univ.,
233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (reinstatement denied after participating in
off campus civil rights demonstrations enjoined by state court); Zarichny v. State
Bd. of Agric., mandamus denied, Jan. 13 ,1949, rehearing denied, Feb. 28, 1949,Mich. Sup. Ct. (unreported), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949), described in 17
U.S.L. WEEK 3374 (student expelled for arranging meeting in building across
street from college campus, at which indicted Communist was the principal
speaker); People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law School, 198 App. Div. 460.
191 N.Y. Supp. 349 (1921) (mandamus denied to student expelled for making
"disloyal statements with regard to the United States," and for "radical,
Socialistic, and seditious utterances and propaganda calculated to injure the
standing and reputation of said school").
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and in their discretion may make any regulation for their govern-
ment which a parent could make for the same purpose. . . .6
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physi-
cal and moral welfare, and mental training of the pupils, and we
are unable to see why to that end they may not make any rules
or regulations for the government or betterment of their pupils
that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether the rules or
regulations are wise, or their aims worthy, is a matter left solely
to the discretion of the authorities, or parents as the case may be.
7
Acting on this view, and likening a university to a school for girls
on the one hand" and a seminary on the other," even a federal court
would allow a university student to be dismissed without a hearing and
without inquiring into the cause:
The problem of what constitutes an appropriate reason must
clearly be left to those authorities charged with the duty of
maintaining the standards and discipline of the school. . . .
I hold as a matter of law that the defendant is not required to
[hold any hearing before dismissing a student].10
It was enough, for instance, that the student was suspended
"for the general good and reputation of the institution," even when
that determination was made without written charges, confrontation,
or cross-examination of witnesses." University students were expect-
ed to avoid expulsion by consulting "the Golden Rule," rather than a
definite list of specific rules.' 2 They were expected, for instance, to
divine what the college catalogue meant when it provided that:
[T]he college reserves the right to exclude at any time students
whose conduct or academic standing it regards as undesirable.' 3
GStetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924).7Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913). See
also People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186, 187 (1866): "[S]o
long as their rules violate neither divine nor human law, we have no more
authority to interfere than we have to control the domestic discipline of a father
in his family."
8Hall v. Mt. Ida School for Girls, Inc., 258 Mass. 464, 155 N.E. 418
(1927).
9Curry v. Lasell Seminary Co., 168 Mass. 7, 46 N.E. 110 (1897).
'oDehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626, 627 (D. Mass. 1957).
11 State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, cert.
denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928), appeal dismissed, 278 U.S. 661 (1928).12Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C.R. 144, 11 Ohio C.C.
Dec. 515 (1901).
xaBarker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 Atl. 220
(1923).
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To avoid all misunderstanding that a student might misappre-
hend his tenuous, subordinate, and unenforceable status in the univer-
sity, the catalogue might bring the point home this way:
[T]he university reserves the right and the student concedes to
the university the right to require the withdrawal of any student
at any time for any reason deemed sufficient to it, and no reason
for requiring such withdrawal need be given.14
Most lawyers would now perceive among these cases (at least
those involving state universities) a vast number of constitutional
affronts to the fourteenth amendment. To dismiss a student for failure
to attend compulsory chapel," or for participating in an off-campus
political rally,' for example, would appear to violate substantive
due process respecting freedom of speech and the establishment of
religion. To dismiss a student without the semblance of a hearing
would seem to violate procedural due process.17 To dismiss him
without reference to some rule adequately describing proscribed con-
duct appears to violate substantive and procedural due process
14Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435(1928).
15See School Dist. v. Schempp, Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488(1961); McCollum v. School Bd., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Connell v. Gray, 33 Okla. 591,
127 Pac. 417 (1912). See Choper, Religion in the Public Schools: A Proposed
Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REV. 329 (1963); Van Alstyne, Consti-
tutional Separation of Church and State: The Quest for a Coherent Position, 57
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 865 (1963); Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: Full of
Sound and Fury Signifying . . ., 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 1; KURLAND,
RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962).
xeSee Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964);
Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551(1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry,301 U.S. 242 (1937); Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930(1961); Egan v. Moore, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622, 20 App. Div. 2d 150 (1963); aff'd,
14 N.Y.2d 775, 250 N.Y.S.2d 809, 199 N.E.2d 842 (1964); Danskin v. San
Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946); Buckley v.
Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also Pollitt, Campus Censor-
ship: Statutes Barring Speakers From State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L.
REv. 179 (1963); Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some
Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1963).
'7Woods v. Wright, supra note 16; Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
supra note 16; Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn.
1961); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See also Johnson, The
Constitutional Rights of College Students, op. cit. supra note 3; Jacobson, The
Expulsion of Students and Due Process of Law, op. cit. supra note 3; Van Al-
styne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, op. cit. supra note
3; Note, Expulsion of College and Professional Students, op. cit. supra note 3.
5
LAW IN TRANSITION QUARTERLY
alike.18 To dismiss him for reasons unrelated to his academic fitness
would seem arbitrary, and a denial of equal protection.' 9
Surprisingly, however, in few of the cases where constitutional
protection of student academic freedom might have been found was it
even sought. 20 Typically, the cases were mandamus actions ad-
dressed to the discretion of state courts and bottomed on various
common law notions of property or contract. The enfeebled protection
of the law, and the notable lack of constitutional sensitivity of counsel
and courts alike, are appalling. If they cannot be explained and, more
than that, if they cannot now be distinguished or discounted, there
would be no merit or real hope in any suggestion that the Constitution
may be serviceable for the protection of student academic freedom.
II. Law in Transition.
The sorry tradition of legal neglect may be explained, however,
and the typical cases to which we have adverted need not be regarded
as an infallible index for the future. The explanations and distinctions
include the following.
A. The changing character of higher education. During the
time when most of these cases were decided, the opportunity to
acquire a university education was not widely regarded as a significant
'sAmsterdam, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960); Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty - An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL
L.Q. 195 (1955). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 85 S.Ct. 453 (1965); Bouie v. City
of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776
(1964); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Baggett v. Bullitt,
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, and Buckley v. Meng, supra note 16;
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223
(1951); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921); United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174(1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
19 See Baggett v. Bullitt, Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, Slochower v. Board of Educ., Wieman v. Updegraff, and
Speiser v. Randall, supra note 16; Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Regents
of Univ. of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 400 (1928) (dissenting opinion); Steier v. New
York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 1949) (dissenting opinion);
Brooker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909).
See also discussion in text infra, note 60 et seq.
200f over fifty cases reviewed, testing the non-academic dismissal of school
and university students, eleven gave some consideration to fourteenth amend-
ment issues. Of these, only two involved any discussion of the constitutionality
of the substantive standard (as opposed to the procedure) employed by the
educational institution. Five of the eleven cases recognizing constitutional issues
originated in the federal courts, one in 1949 and the other four since 1960.
6
STUDENT ACADEMIC FREEDOM
opportunity of substantial national importance. As a consequence, the
courts could scarcely be expected to become exercised in reviewing
the bases employed by colleges to restrict a seemingly unimportant
personal privilege. Currently, however, the personal and national
significance of university education enjoys unprecedented recognition.
We have come to realize that the opportunity to learn in association
with an academic community has enormous value for the student as
an individual and for the nation as well. The right to enter into and to
maintain that association is valued first of all for its intrinsic opportu-
nities: the pursuit of knowledge, individual self-fulfillment, growth,
and expression. Brigaded with these are extrinsic opportunities: to
acquire useful professional skills indispensable to employment which
is itself self-fulfilling and sufficient to provide an income necessary to
meet one's other basic interests in food, shelter, family, and leisure.
It is not only that the average college graduate's life income will
exceed that of others by over $100,000, for averages understate even
the economics of a college degree. It is increasingly likely that absent
college preparation, employment itself becomes a remote, risky, and
short-lived prospect. What the Supreme Court observed in the field of
primary education a decade ago is equally applicable today at the
university level:
In these days, it is doubtful that any [person] may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of a
[college] education.2'
Beyond the individual, there are of course the incalculable values
of university education to society. Our universities provide a principal
source of research and development, nearly the entire source of
professional talent, a vast number of direct services, and a humanizing
influence uniquely capable of reconciling stability with change
through civilized means. The political, economic, scientific, and social
significance of university education is reflected in the spectacular
increase in university enrollment within the last decade, and the
commensurate rise of state, local, and private fiscal support. At the
national level, the felt importance of adequate education is equally
obvious. Federal appropriations for education rose from roughly two
hundred million dollars in 1956 to 750 million in 1964, and the
President's message to Congress proposes to double that amount in
1965 alone. The New York Times succinctly summarized the current
21Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), where the Court
also noted that: "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments."
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primacy of education in national policy: "In choosing the cornerstone
for his 'Great Society,' the President has said: 'We begin with learn-
ing. . . .22 1 propose,' said Mr. Johnson, 'that we declare a national
goal of full educational opportunity.' "23 The first distinction to be
noted, therefore, is the shift of significance respecting interests in
higher education. Accordingly, we might also expect our courts to
respond by appropriately insuring that interests in higher education
are not denied for arbitrary reasons or by arbitrary means.
B. The changing character of academic freedom. As previously
noted, earlier cases were fought out by borrowing and stretching
traditional notions of property and contract rights. While these rights
were regarded as significant, they did not bring any special quality to a
student's claim for legal protection. Rather, dismissal of a student was
generally regarded simply as raising a question of whether the univer-
sity had stuck by its bargain - a question usually resolved in favor of
the university because its charter and rules generally indicated that it
had committed itself to very little, if anything.24 Here again, the
courts were merely reflecting then current attitudes toward student
22N.Y. Times Jan. 13, 1965, p. 75, col. 1. See also remarks of Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, N.Y. Times Feb. 2, 1965, p. 30, col. 7: "Higher
education is no longer a luxury but a necessity."
231d. at p. 20, col. 1. Compare Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518, 634 (1819): "That education is an object of national concern
... all admit." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); "The American
people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters
of supreme importance. . . ."
24See, e.g., Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 78 N.Y. Supp.
739 (1902); People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law School, 198 App. Div.
460, 191 N.Y. Supp. 349 (1921); People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40
111. 186 (1866); North v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 137 Ill. 296, 27
N.E. 54 (1891); White v. Portia Law School, 274 Mass 162, 174 N.E. 187(1931), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 611 (1932); Samson v. Trustees of Columbia
Univ., 101 Mis. 146, 167 N.Y. Supp. 202 (1917); Frank v. Marquette Univ.,
209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932); State ex rel. Stallard v. White, 82 Ind. 278(1882); Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924); Woods v.
Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 126 Atl. 882 (1924): Steier v. New York Educ.
Comm'r., 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959); Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp.
626 (D. Mass. 1957); People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees of University of
Ill., 10 Ill. App.2d 207, 134 N.E. 2d 635 (1956); State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp,
81 Mont. 200, 263 Pac. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1927); appeal
dismissed, 278 U.S. 661 (1928); Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio
C.C.R. 144, 11 Ohio C.C. Dec. 515 (1901); Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr
College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 Atl. 220 (1923); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224
App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1928); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376,
161 S.W. 204 (1913); Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924);
People ex rel. O'Sullivan v. New York Law School, 68 Hun. 115, 22 N.Y. Supp.
663 (1893). See also Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L.
REV. 1406 (1957); Note, Private Government on the Campus - Judicial
Review of University Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1367-70, 1377-79 (1963);
Note, The College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 1962
ILL. L.F. 438 (1962).
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rights, for little was said to suggest that a student's educational
opportunity, subject only to conditions respecting academic fitness and
a mutual respect for the like opportunity of others, might itself state an
interest deserving legal protection, an interest in academic freedom.
Thus, in 1915, the American Association of University Professors
turned its back on the continental tradition of Lernfreiheit and utterly
ignored students in its concept of academic freedom. "Academic
freedom," announced one of its founders, "is the freedom of the
teacher." 2 5 In prefacing its report, the AAUP declared:
It need scarcely be pointed out that the freedom which is the
subject of this report is that of the teacher. 2 6
More recently, however, overdue recognition that academic free-
dom equally applies to the freedom to learn has been achieved.
Lernfreiheit has been revived both in terms of policy and law.27 In
1964, for instance, a committee of the AAUP was in the concluding
stages of drafting a detailed statement of student academic freedom
which begins:
Freedom to teach and freedom to learn are indivisible. Free-
dom to learn depends upon appropriate conditions and opportu-
nities in the classroom, as well as opportunities to exercise the
rights of citizenship on and off the campus. The achievement and
continuance of these conditions of freedom require not only a
definition of rights but the establishment of procedures for their
protection. 28
Belated recognition of Lernfreiheit by the AAUP parallels re-
cent and earlier statements of policy respecting student academic
freedom by the American Civil Liberties Union and the National
25Lovejoy, Academic Freedom, 1 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. 384 (1930).
261 A.A.U.P. BULL. 20 (1915). See also van den Haag, Academic Freedom
in the United States, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB 515-16 (1963); Hook, Freedom
to Learn But Not to Riot, N.Y. Times Mag., Jan. 3, 1965, p. 8.
27That this recognition is "overdue" is clear as a historical matter from the
fact that it was lernfreiheit rather than lehrfreiheit which was more closely
identified with the German tradition of academic freedom which we purported
to adopt near the turn of the century. See HOFSTADTER & METZGER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATEs 383-98 (1955).
See also the broad definition of academic freedom by Machlup, On Some Mis-
conceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BULL. 753 (1955);
Monypenny, Toward a Standard for Student Academic Freedom 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 625 (1963); Chorley, Academic Freedom in the United King-
dom, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 647, 668 (1963); Commager, The University
and Freedom: "Lehrfreiheit" and "Lernfreiheit," 34 J. HIGHER EDUC. 361
(1963). And see Williamson, Students' Academic Freedom, EDUCATIONAL
RECORD 124 (July, 1963); Williamson, Do Students Have Academic Freedom?,
COLLEGE AND UNIv. 466 (1946).2sReprinted in 50 A.A.U.P. BULL. 254 (1964).
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Student Association. 29 These and similar expressions have moved
the National Association of Student Personnel Administrators "to
undertake a major national research survey dealing with the rights
and responsibilities of students in their out-of-classroom desires to
hear, critically examine, and to express viewpoints concerning issues
that face the society. This study is the focal point of the contemporary
concept of academic freedom for students."30
The gradual recognition of academic freedom has slowly made
its way into judicial declarations, some of which specifically include an
acknowledgment of the right to learn. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
for instance, the Supreme Court expressly relied upon "academic
freedom" as a constitutionally protected interest and further ob-
served:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide
and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil
the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any,
principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish
in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and stu-
dents must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.31
The altered perspective on academic freedom has carried over into
the states. Thus, in reversing an injunction against the appearance of a
communist speaker on the campus of the University of Buffalo, a New
York court declared in 1963:
Petitioner contends that allowing avowed communists to preach
their ideology at a tax-supported university cloaks their activities
with a mantle of academic and intellectual integrity which makes
their subversive propaganda more susceptible to impressionable
young people, but we believe that the tradition of our great society
has been to allow our universities in the name of academic
29ACLU, Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges
and Universities (1961) (revised, Nov., 1963), reprinted in 48 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 110 (1962); NSA, Student Bill of Responsibilities and Rights (originally
passed in 1947, most recently revised in 1964).
8oNASPA COMMIssIoN VIII DaFr 1 (mimeo., Dec. 10, 1964). (Em-
phasis added.)
a1354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
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freedom to explore and expose their students to controversial
issues without government interference. 32
Judicial recognition of the importance of a university education is also
evident from recent federal court holdings applying procedural due
process to protect students from dismissal without an adequate hear-
ing:
The precise nature of the private interest involved in this case is
the right to remain at a public institution of higher learning in
which the plaintiffs were students in good standing. It requires no
argument to demonstrate that education is vital and, indeed,
basic to civilized society. Without sufficient education the
plaintiffs would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to
enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the
duties and responsibilities of good citizens. 3
With the upgraded importance of student academic freedom,
there has come a downgrading of the earlier notion that, as a mere
"privilege," attendance at a public university could be terminated
without cause or hearing because - by definition - no "right" to
attend was involved. Thus, still another federal district court ordered
reinstatement of college students who had been dismissed without an
adequate hearing, basing its holding on the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and overriding the "privilege" argument which
would have been a sufficient defense in years gone by:
The defendants' argument that the interest which the plaintiffs
have in attending a state university is a mere privilege and not a
constitutional right was specifically rejected in the Dixon case,
and the Court thinks rightfully so. Whether the interest involved
be described as a right or a privilege, the fact remains that it is an
interest of almost incalculable value, especially to those students
who have already enrolled in the institution and begun the
pursuit of their college training. Private interests are to be
evaluated under the due process clause of the fourteenth
Amendment, not in terms of labels or fictions, but in terms of
their true significance and worth.3 4
Moreover, these judicial opinions are not libertarian inventions of
subordinate courts. In recent years, the Supreme Court itself has
equally rejected identical defenses ineffectually employed to insulate
32Egan v. Moore, 245 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624, 20 App. Div. 2d 150, 151-
52 (1963), afl'd, 14 N.Y.2d 775, 250 N.Y.S.2d 809, 199 N.E.2d 842 (1964).
33Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
34Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174, 178 (M.D. Tenn.
1961).
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the arbitrary dismissal of college teachers from constitutional review,
the defense, i.e., that their employment was a mere privilege wholly
subject to the state's uncircumscribed discretion:
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to
public employment exists [in a college teacher]. It is sufficient to
say that constitutional protection does extend to the public
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbi-
trary or discriminatory."'
To state that a person does not have a constitutional right to
government employment is only to say that he must comply with
reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down by
the proper authorities.36
What is true for teachers and the "privilege" of teaching is, as we have
noted, equally true for students and the "privilege" of learning. Rules
which would exclude them from the orderly pursuit of knowledge and
which are themselves not reasonably related to the protection of the
opportunity of others to learn, equally abridge the right or privilege of
student academic freedom.
C. The changing character of constitutional liberties.
As the importance of higher education has altered, and as the
concept of academic freedom has been extended, so too has the
practical content of the fourteenth amendment undergone enormous
expansion. It is in the difference between the condition of constitution-
al liberties of today and fifty years ago that the most adequate
explanation may be found for the evident failure of earlier courts to
examine the claim of academic freedom under the fourteenth amend-
ment.
In one sense, the difference is as vast as that between the Civil
Rights Cases of 1883,"3 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 8 Between
these years, the Supreme Court worked an enormous expansion of the
constitutional protection of civil liberties. From Patterson v. Colo-
35Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).36Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956).
37109 U.S. 3 (1883).
38Applied and upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 85
S.Ct. 348 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 85 S.Ct. 377 (1964), and
applied to abate prior convictions in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 85 S.Ct. 384
(1964). See also the concurring opinions in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226
(1964).
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rado,"9 in which Mr. Justice Holmes doubted whether the Constitu-
tion's protection of speech did more than to incorporate the common
law against prior restraint, to Times v. Sullivan, and nearly absolute
protection of political discourse. 40 From the Slaughterhouse Cases
where the Court was of the opinion that equal protection might apply
only against racial discrimination4' (and even then only against the
most outrageous forms), to Brown v. Board of Educ., Morey v. Doud,
Griffin v. Illinois, and Baker v. Carr, enveloping equal opportunities
in voting, criminal procedure, business, and education.4 2 From Mr.
Justice Stone's footnote in Carolene Products of 1938, where civil
liberties were first passingly acknowledged as preferred constitutional
values,4 3 to the point where virtually eighty per cent of the Court's
current constitutional caseload involves the protection of these pre-
ferred values.4 4 It would unnecessarily labor the point to proliferate
examples, but perhaps at least two are in order. In outlining the early
judicial response to claims for academic freedom, we briefly quoted
from a 1917 New York state court which upheld the dismissal of a
university student who conducted himself off campus in a manner
inconsistent with the school's supererogatory mission to inculcate
patriotism. The constitutional and philosophical bases against such a
39205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). But see Mr. Justice Holmes' subsequent
statement in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
40376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUPREME COURT REV.
191. To see how very far we have come, compare LEVY, THE LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION (1960).
4183 U.S. 36, 81 (1873). See also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 308
(1927).
42At 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 354 U.S. 457 (1957), 351 U.S. 12 (1956), 369
U.S. 186 (1962), respectively. See discussions on the expansion of the equal
protection clause in Kellett, The Expansion of Equality, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 400
(1964); Kurland, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REV. 143-49 (1964).
43United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For
additional due process and equal protection cases carrying forward the "pre-
ferred value" distinction, see McLaughlin v. Florida, 85 S.Ct. 283 (1964);
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bantam
Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398(1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535(1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940). See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767
n.2 (1945). But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (concurring
opinion); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUPREME COURT REV. 34.44E.g., in the 1963-1964 Term of Court, forty of the fifty decisions
accompanied by an opinion and concerned with constitutional questions, were
roughly within the "civil rights-civil liberties" field, as reported by the American
Jewish Congress.
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view first appeared in a judicial opinion two years later, in a dissent by
Mr. Justice Holmes who said:
[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which [our] wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every
day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our
system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against at-
tempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing pur-
poses of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country.45
In 1943, this concept of protected free speech was applied to condemn
a state statute requiring students to salute the flag "for the purpose of
teaching, fostering and perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirit of
Americanism." Rejecting the pinched view of the New York court of
1917, and in keeping with Holmes' attitude toward freedom of
speech the Supreme Court declared:
Free public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular instruc-
tion and political neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of
any class, creed, party, or faction. If it is to impose any ideological
discipline, however, each party or denomination must seek to
control, or failing that, to weaken the influence of the educa-
tional system....
The fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, pro-
tects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures -
Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, impor-
tant, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that
they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That
they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupu-
lous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we
are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere plati-
tudes. 6
45Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES (1941); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUPREME COURT REV. 191;
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877(1963); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424(1962); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUPREME
COURT REV. 245.
46West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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Again, contrast the 1891 opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court,
reflecting indifference to the separation of church and state and
permitting a state university to compel chapel attendance, with the
altered significance of the establishment clause in U.S. Supreme Court
opinions since 1947:
Neither [a state nor the federal government] can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance.47
The Establishment Clause withdrew from the sphere of legiti-
mate legislative concern and competence a specific, but compre-
hensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the
verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression in action
of that belief or disbelief. Congress may not make these matters,
as such, the subject of legislation, nor, now, may any legislature
in this country.48
The point to this abridged synopsis of changing concepts of civil
liberties and constitutional rights is not to engender agreement or
disagreement with the Supreme Court. It is merely to establish that a
significant change has occurred, and to indicate that the change
necessarily operates to discredit the earlier tradition in which student
academic freedom was not a matter of legal or constitutional con-
cern.
D. Miscellaneous observations. Beyond the changing condi-
tions we have noted, there are several smaller ones which further
illuminate the relative insignificance of the law's earlier disregard of
student academic freedom. Included among these is the fact that
today a far higher percentage of students are enrolled in public
universities than was previously the case. All of these institutions are
of course subject to the fourteenth amendment. Private universities
are not constitutionally committed to an equal measure of self-
restraint, and consequently it is unsurprising that the majority of
earlier cases, which most often concerned private institutions, failed to
raise constitutional issues. Today, as an increasing number of univer-
47Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).48McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961) (concurring opin-
ion). See also note 15 supra.
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sities participate in government subsidies, they as well as other schools
officially established as state universities become amenable to the
fourteenth amendment.49 Correspondingly, the prospect for the pro-
tection of student academic freedom through constitutional litigation
increases.
Another factor worthy of mention is the expansion of federal
jurisdiction which provides students with access to the federal courts to
test their claims of academic freedom. Until recently, due process
claims generally, could be brought in the federal courts only where
the amount in controversy exceeded $3,000 (now $10,000). The
requirement was an obvious deterrent to students, since exact mone-
tary loss was difficult to prove and ordinarily the student preferred
reinstatement to damages. With the revitalization of 28 U.S.C. § 1343
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape in 1961, freer access to
federal courts to test fourteenth amendment claims is now available,
and prior exhaustion of local administrative and judicial remedies is
not required. While it is true that certain cases originating in the
state courts have always been appealable to the Supreme Court, the
practical opportunity for appeal (and thus for a more adequate testing
of the constitutional claim) was very limited; ordinarily, since such
cases involved the application of a university rule rather than a state
statute, rejection of the constitutional claim in the state court left the
student plaintiff only with the privilege of applying for discretionary
review by the Supreme Court. And since the state courts astutely
tended to attach an adequate and independent local law reason for
refusing the student relief, certiorari was very rarely granted. Thus,
only since 1961 have student claims of academic freedom based upon
the fourteenth amendment really had a fair chance of being adequately
reviewed in a federal court.50
49The voluminous state action literature is collected in Van Alstyne, Mr.
Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action, 1965
DUKE L.J. ...... , n ..... See also MILLER RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVATE
EDUCATION (1957). Instructive cases include Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130
(1964); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Board of
Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964);
Guillory v. Adm'rs of Tulane Univ., 203 F.Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962). But see
In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357
U.S. 570 (1958); Guillory v. Adm'rs of Tulane Univ., 212 F.Supp. 674 (E.D.
La. 1962).
5oThe legal materials for this paragraph are briefly described in Van
Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, 10 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 368, 373-74, nn. 24 & 34. The critical statutes are 28 U.S.C. H§ 1331,
1332, 1343(3), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958). The critical cases are
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Finally, there is the factual demise of in loco parentis as an
adequate basis for relegating university students to a condition of
second-class citizenship. In earlier decades, the concept had some
superficial appeal, if only because the vast majority of college students
were quite young and generally below the age of eighteen.51 Today,
in contrast, there are more students between the ages of thirty and
thirty-five in our universities than there are of those under eighteen,
and the latter group accounts for only 7% of total college enroll-
ment. 52 Indeed, when apologia of in loco parentis were tentatively
McNeese v. Board of Educ. 373 U.S. 668 (1963), and Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961). Their significance is fully explored by Klitgaard, The Civil
Rights Act and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 145 (1961); Note, Sec-
tion 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 839 (1964). Cases illustrating remarks in the text and contrasting the
significance of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in protecting students from arbitrary dis-
missal before and after Monroe v. Pape include Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d
369 (5th Cir. 1964); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Steier v. New York
State Educ. Comm'r., 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959); Due v. Florida A. & M.
Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200
F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F.Supp. 626
(D. Mass. 1957). A case illustrating the manner in which even dubious state
grounds for refusing relief may insulate a student's significant constitutional
objection from discretionary review by the Supreme Court, is elucidated in the
petitioner's brief, Zarichny v. State Bd. of Agric., mandamus denied, Jan. 13,
1949, rehearing denied, Feb. 28, 1949, Mich. Sup. Ct. (unreported), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 816 (1949), described in 17 U.S.L. WEEK 3374.
51Additional arguments for and against in loco parentis are reviewed in
Van Alstyne, Procedural Due Process and State University Students, supra note
50 at 375-78; In Loco Parentis (Nat'l Student Ass'n, Phil., Johnston ed. 1962);
Note, Private Government on the Campus - Judicial Review of University
Expulsions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1379-81 (1963). It is interesting that Blackstone
acknowledged substantial limits to a parent's authority over his child, that a
schoolmaster's exercise of in loco parentis was based upon a delegation (rather
than an assumption) of the parent's prerogatives, and that the schoolmaster's
authority was only "as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is
employed." Moreover, Blackstone noted that "the power of a father, I say, over
the persons of his children ceases at the age of twenty-one." BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES 782-84 (8th ed., 1890, Bancroft-Whitney pub.).
Even in cases involving secondary school children, a number of courts have
protected students from arbitrary action, notwithstanding an attempted in loco
parentis defense. See, e.g., Haycraft v. Grigsby, 88 Mo. App. 354 (1901), 94
Mo. App. 74, 67 S.W. 965 (1902); Phillips v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354, 358(1930) ("Our Supreme Court has held that even an officer is not justified in
searching a whiskey runner's car on suspicion. . . . A child in the public schools
of the state is entitled to as much protection as a bootlegger.") Miami Military
Institute v. Leff, 129 Misc. 481, 220 N.Y. Supp. 799 (1926); Lander v. Seaver,
32 Vt. 114 (1859); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903); Geiger
v. Milford School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647 (1944); McClintock v. Lake Forest
Univ., 222 Ill. App. 468 (1921). But see State ex rel. Burpee v. Burton, 45 Wis.
150 (1878); State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837); Vermillion v. State ex
rel. Englehardt, 78 Neb. 107, 110 N.W. 736 (1907); Smith v. Board of Educ.,182 111. App. 342 (1913).
52U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, Population Characteristics, Series P-20, No. 110, at 12,
July 24, 1961.
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offered in defense of university restrictions at Berkeley last year, a
hasty retreat was taken when it was pointed out that the overwhelming
majority of students were more than twenty-one years of age.
These, then, are the reasons why one need not despair in
contemplating the prospects for constitutional protection of student
academic freedom. Beyond that, they may also provide a tentative
justification for sketching a constitutional prospectus, one which at-
tempts to define student academic freedom and to test the constitu-
tional permissibility of particular university rules according to the
extent of their consistency with that freedom. 3
III. The Protection of Student Academic Freedom
Statements of student academic freedom ordinarily have laid
understandable stress on affirmative, substantive rights. Generally,
these statements have agreed that the hard core of student academic
freedom is "freedom to learn." From this common point, various
degrees of recognition and emphases are then extended to other rights
in terms of their dependence upon this central one, e.g., the right to
hear, to study, to write, to discuss, to experience, to explore, and to
exercise rights of citizenship.5 4
When one addresses himself to constitutional limitations on the
police power of states, these statements of student academic freedom
may be extremely useful. They can be employed in formulating
sensible substantive due process claims sufficient to check the states
from punishing individuals for exercising certain educational preroga-
tives merely as private citizens. Such was the case in Meyer v. Nebras-
ka,55 in which the Supreme Court struck down a state law which
made it a criminal offense to teach any subject in any school (includ-
ing the private school involved there) in any languuage other than
53In addition, reinstatement following dismissal has sometimes successfully
been sought on non-constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Tanton v. McKenney, 226
Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924), cases cited in note 51 supra, and dicta in
Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 AtI. 14 (1904); Barnard v.
Inhabitants of Shelbourne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913); Gleason v.
University of Minn., 104 Minn. 359, 116 N.W. 650 (1908); Cecil v. Bellevue
Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y. Supp. 490, aff'd mem., 128 N.Y.
621, 28 N.E. 353 (1891). See also University of Ceylon v. Fernando, 1 Weekly
L.R. 223 (1960), reversing 58 N.L.R. 265 (Ceylon, 1956); general discussions
in note 1 supra.54See notes 27-29 supra.55262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923): "While this court has not attempted to define
with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed [by the due process clause], the term
has received much consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes . . . the right of the individual . .
to acquire useful knowledge. . . ."
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English. Such was the case in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 6 in which
the Court struck down an Oregon statute effectively making it a
misdemeanor for one's children to attend a parochial school of their
choice. Such a case, too, is West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,7
where the combination of laws actually raised a clear substantive due
process issue. The Barnette case involved a rule making the flag salute
compulsory in school, but something more than mere dismissal was
threatened against those who did not comply. A student failing to obey
the rule was subject not only to dismissal, but to criminal prosecution
as a delinquent. Additionally, his parents were separately subject to
criminal prosecution for having contributed to that delinquency, i.e.,
for having failed to coerce him into saluting the flag and for thereby
becoming "responsible" for his dismissal from school.
In each of these cases, the challenged state laws were attempts to
force individuals to do something or to abstain from something other-
wise within their capacity or inclination, under threat of jail. In each,
the regulatory or general police authority of the state was backed by a
threat of punishment directed against personal liberty or the depriva-
tion of some incident of property owned by the individuals or groups
being regulated.
The problem which concerns us, however, is not immediately of
this kind. For our concern is not with state laws which punish the
nonconformist by threatening to jail him and thus to take away the
liberty he previously enjoyed as a private individual. It is, rather, with
public university rules the violation of which results, at worst, "mere-
ly" in the withdrawal of an opportunity which the state has otherwise
undertaken to provide: rules affecting one's status as a student at a
public university, enforceable merely by dismissing the student and
not by sending him to jail. Our concern, in short, is with cases more
like Hamilton v. Board of Regents, where the "privilege" of attending
the University of California was made conditional upon the
willingness of the student to take courses in military instruction and
where violation of the condition meant only that the student could not
attend the university.-"
56268 U.S. 510 (1925).
57319 U.S. 624 (1943), expressly distinguished Hamilton v. Regents of the
University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) on this basis.
58293 U.S. 245 (1934). Compare School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961); McCollum v. School Bd., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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While a number of cases have blurred the distinction," the
difference we have noticed continues to be of considerable
significance. In constitutional parlance, our concern is properly one of
equal protection rather than one of substantive due process. It is with
the reasonableness of conditions which limit educational opportunities
which states have chosen to provide through public universities, rather
than with things which states may be constitutionally obliged to
provide in the first place, or with things which states may not forbid
individuals to provide or to do for themselves. We are thus in search of
some means to determine whether certain rules which limit the
"privilege" to secure an education in a publicly-supported university
are arbitrary: whether they arbitrarily eliminate some who are as
entitled as others to whatever educational advantages the state pro-
vides at the university level.
A. Substantive due process, equal protection, and the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions.
While the problem is essentially one of equal protection, certain
elements of substantive due process turn out to be of great significance
in determining the minimum content of equal protection. A doctrine
which encapsulates the vital connection between due process and
equal protection, in testing the reasonableness of conditions which
restrict a state-supplied opportunity, is the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. 60
The distinction between "rights" and "privileges" which frequently blocked
relief when substantive due process (rather than equal protection) was relied
upon finds its most familiar expression in a dictum by Mr. Justice Holmes,
McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892): "The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman." See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537 (1950); Walker v. Clinton, 244 Iowa 1099, 59 N.W.2d 785(1953); State ex rel. Billado v. Control Comm'r, 114 Vt. 350, 45 A.2d 430
(1946); Blackman v. Board of Liquor Control, 95 Ohio App. 177, 113 N.E.2d
893, appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 368, 109 N.E.2d 475 (1952).59Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963): "Nor may the South
Carolina court's construction of the statute be saved from constitutional infirmi-
ty on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant's
'right' but merely a 'privilege.' It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties
of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege." See also notes 31-37 supra; note 60 infra.6oSee NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 309 (1964);
Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 59; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368
U.S. 278, 288 (1961); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519-20 (1958); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350
U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952); Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1946); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496(1939); Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926);
Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Terral v. Burke
20
STUDENT ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions generally holds that
enjoyment of governmental benefits may not be conditioned upon the
waiver or relinquishment of significant constitutional rights, in the
absence of some compelling social interest which justifies the subordi-
nation of those rights under the circumstances. It has been held, for
instance, that a state cannot condition the privilege of a foreign
corporation to engage in local commerce upon the willingness of the
corporation to relinquish its federal right to remove diversity actions to
an appropriate federal court."' Similarly, it has been held that a state
cannot compel a person to surrender substantive due process rights of
belief, speech, and association, as a condition of receiving the
benefit of property tax exemptions for which he otherwise
qualifies. 2 In these and other cases, the state was admittedly free
wholly to withhold a benefit it was without constitutional obligation to
provide. In electing to provide that benefit, however, the state was not
free to do so in a manner which operated to abridge constitutional
rights. In each case, the invalid abridgment resulted not from a direct
prohibition of the right, but from subjecting the adversely affected
party to an unreasonable dilemma - a choice free in law but not in
fact - to suffer a loss of constitutional freedom or to forego benefits
which those with fewer scruples might enjoy. Understandably, the
Supreme Court has taken the position that government may not use its
wealth and power ineluctably to erode the constitutional rights of
those too weak to resist temptation, too indifferent to their own
welfare, or too cynical to care. It has maintained, rather, that any
restrictions on the availability of governmental benefits must be
independently justified by compelling interests which are substantially
connected with such restrictions.6 1 Otherwise, these restrictions will
be invalidated as arbitrary, i.e., as a denial of equal protection.
Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922); Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186 (1887); United
States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 922
(1964); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Calif. 1964), cert. granted, 33 U.S. L.
WEEK 3262 (1965); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536,
171 P.2d 885 (1946); Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1962). See also
Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 321 (1935); Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879
(1929); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
61Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922). See also Barron
v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186 (1887); Insurance Co. v. Morris, 87 U.S. 445 (1874).62Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
63The state's countervailing interests must be "compelling" and must be
"substantially" related to the qualification of the privilege in question, if the
privilege being qualified involves one of the "preferred" constitutional values.
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. The doctrine has considerable relevance to the permissible scope
of university rules. As citizens, students are constitutionally free (and
protected in that freedom) to engage in a vast variety of activities, or
to abstain from such activities, as they choose. They may, for in-
stance, exercise their freedom of speech to ridicule the governor,
argue for the admission of Red China to the United Nations, sign a
petition urging a general blockade of Cuba, or participate in orderly
demonstrations to promote any lawful end. 4 They may exercise their
See note 43 supra. Contrast the degree of judicial review manifest in these cases
with that exercised in Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).64See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 85 S.Ct. 453 (1965); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58
(1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157 (1961); Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Kunz v. New
York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937). For discussion of on-campus political activity, see Pollitt,
Campus Censorship: Statutes Barring Speakers From State Educational Institu-
tions, 42 N.C. L. REV. 179 (1963); Murphy, Educational Freedom in the
Courts, 49 A.A.U.P. BULL. 39 (1963); Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State
Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 328
(1963); Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom to Berkeley Div. of
Univ. of Calif. Academic Senate (Jan. 5, 1965). Cases sustaining the equal right
of invited speakers to use school or university auditoriums to present their
views, regardless of their affiliation, include Danskin v. San Diego Unified
School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946); Egan v. Moore, 245
N.Y.S.2d 622, 20 App. Div.2d 150 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 775, 250 N.Y.S.2d
809, 199 N.E.2d 842 (1964); Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1962). It
may be of interest that during the course of an address to the student body of
Ohio State University, in 1961, former Senator Goldwater observed:
I think that schools make a mistake when they deny their students the right
to hear all sides. I even go so far as to say that if a man is a Communist
and he wants to be invited to speak, let the students hear these people. The
listening to these gentlemen will only broaden their knowledge and
strengthen their convictions in one way or the other.
For more general discussions of freedom of speech, see, e.g., HUDON,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA (1963); LEVY, JEFFERSON AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1963); HOOK, THE PARADOXES OF FREEDOM (1962); LEVY,
THE LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960); MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
(1960); CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY (1956); CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1941). Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUPREME COURT
REv. 191; Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern
Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581 (1964); Mendelson, The First
Amendment and the Judicial Process, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1964); Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963);
Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law? - A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51
CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amend-
ment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962); Frantz, The
First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Meiklejohn, The
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religious liberties by subscribing to a church of their own choice or by
steadfastly remaining aloof from any religious endeavor.65 They may
travel where they choose,6 6 associate with whom they please,67
listen to whom they like, and read what interests them, all without
governmental restrictions not constitutionally valid against citizens in
general.
Accordingly, if any of these preferred liberties are to be surren-
dered or qualified as a condition of remaining in good standing at a
public university, it can only be as a result of some compelling societal
interest which specially justifies such a restriction under the circum-
stances of associating with a university. 8 Unless the exercise of these
liberties can fairly be said substantially to impair the legitimate
purposes for which a university is established and maintained, more-
over, it cannot readily be seen how a university-imposed restriction
upon those liberties can be justified.
Although this statement of the matter might appear to be self-
evident, it is of extreme importance because it reiterates at least two
propositions generally overlooked by a number of courts and univer-
sities. First, it makes clear that a university rule which threatens a
student with dismissal for any activity he is constitutionally entitled to
pursue as a citizen carries the burden of establishing precisely how
that activity would especially interfere with the legitimate business of
the university. Thus, a student is under no obligation to demonstrate
how all of his general conduct contributes to his education, or how it
positively enhances whatever opportunities the university provides,
if his conduct relates to matters which the state is not otherwise free
to forbid. A student need not, for instance, defend his purchase and
reading of Lady Chatterly's Lover, Tropic of Cancer, American
Opinion Magazine (the Birch organ), or his signature on a petition
calling for the abolition of the House Committee on UnAmerican
Activities, for he is free to pursue these enterprises as a citizen,
sheltered from restriction by the state by the First Amendment. In-
First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUPREME COURT REv. 245; Nutting, Is
the First Amendment Obsolete? 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 167 (1961); McKay,
The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1182 (1959).
65See cases and materials supra, notes 15, 46-48, 58.
-See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941);
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
67For a significant recent discussion, see Emerson, Freedom of Association
and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
68See notes 43, 60, 63 supra.
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short, the following view of the Illinois Supreme Court of 1891 is, as a
general proposition, absolutely incorrect:
By voluntarily entering the university, [the student] necessarily
surrenders very many of his individual rights. How his time shall
be occupied; what his habits shall be; his general deportment;
that he shall not visit certain places; his hours of study and
recreation,-in all these matters, and many others, he must yield
obedience to those, who for the time being, are his masters. . . .9
Rather, by entering the university an individual necessarily surrenders
no constitutionally protected right the qualification of which is not
essential to the lawful business of the university.
Second, not only does the university have the burden to
demonstrate in what manner a given rule is necessary to preserve its
functions, it must of course take care that the functions it assumes and
seeks to protect by that rule are themselves constitutionally legitimate.
It cannot, for instance, promiscuously incorporate within a general
function of "education" a number of objectives constitutionally with-
drawn from the state itself. It may not defend a rule requiring chapel
attendance, or payment of a fee to support a religious affairs center,
by attempting to incorporate direct support of religion as an aspect of
some presumed function of "educating students in good morals." It
may not forbid students from listening to George Lincoln Rockwell, or
from affiliating with the Communist Party (at least off campus and on
their own time) by attempting to incorporate direct support of politi-
cal orthodoxy as an aspect of some presumed function of "educating
students in good citizenship." It may rule against such conduct only to
the extent that some particular manifestation disrupts or detracts from
its legitimate business, as it would were students to demonstrate for
Rockwell by parading through classrooms, or as it would were a
student to declaim noisily in favor of communism in the middle of the
library. Such rules, of course, are aimed at the necessity for order to
enable the university to get on with its lawful business, and to enable
others to take advantage of whatever the university provides.70 The
impact of these rules on constitutionally protected rights which stu-
dents have as citizens is purely incidental, their thrust is to the
reasonable time, place, and manner of exercising private rights com-
69North v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 137 Ill. 296, 27 N.E. 54, 56
(1891).7oSee, e.g., Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941); Clemmons v. Congress of Racial Equality, 201 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. La.
1962); People v. Nahman, 298 N.Y. 95, 81 N.E.2d 36 (1948).
24
STUDENT ACADEMIC FREEDOM
patibly with the university's business, their necessity is clear, and their
neutral enforcement is accordingly unobjectionable.
It may still appear that what we have suggested as to the
permissible scope of university rules is extremely bold. If so, it is
probably because of a general failure to keep touch with the bold
development of substantive due process, and not because we would
necessarily disagree with the relevance of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions. We may have assumed, for instance, that Lady
Chatterly's Lover or Tropic of Cancer were not protected against state
censorship. But the fact is otherwise,' and it is correspondingly
doubtful whether adult-age students7 2 can be barred from reading
them on their own time as a condition of matriculating or remaining in
good standing at a state university. We may have supposed that
membership in the Communist Party is per se subject to criminal
punishment, but that again is false.7 1 Indeed, it remains doubtful
whether a state university can dismiss even a teacher solely because of
such an affiliation, since "membership itself may be innocent"74 and
the fact of membership does not itself establish that the teacher has
abused his position in the university or acted to bring about an
avoidable evil. Much more would probably have to be shown before
dismissing a student who has no classroom in which he exercises
authority over a captive audience, who does not so significantly
participate in institutional government, and who draws no salary from
the state.
In fact, however, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does
not carry us far enough. For all it does is to provide that a student may
71See Grove Press v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577 (1964); Grove Press v.
Christenberry, 276 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1960). See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184 (1964); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Bantam
Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962); Marcus v. Property Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360
U.S. 684 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
72See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). Two particularly outstand-
ing pieces of writing re so-called obscene speech are Kalven, The Metaphysics
of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUPREME COURT REV. 1; Lockhart & McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN.
L. REV. 5 (1960).73Compare Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Yates v United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d 810 (9th Cir.
1961), with Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).74Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190 (1952). See also Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S.
278 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956);
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
25
LAW IN TRANSITION QUARTERLY
not be dismissed from a public university for engaging in conduct
which the state could not punish generally, or for refusing to engage in
conduct which the state could not require generally. (And even this is
subject to the qualification that where the conduct would especially
affect a substantial legitimate concern of the university not shared by
the state in general, a rule forbidding or requiring that conduct may be
tolerable.)
By negative implication, moreover, it leaves the public university
free to dismiss a student for any conduct otherwise subject to general
restriction by valid state laws. For a rule which threatens to dismiss
any student who violates a valid law does not appear to state a
condition which operates to abridge any constitutional right, and thus
it can scarcely be described as an unconstitutional condition in the
technical sense thus far employed. One has no constitutional right to
drive drunkenly, for instance, and he cannot successfully claim that
any constitutional prerogative is abridged by a general law which
makes drunk driving a punishable offense. Similarly, a university rule
which operates merely to withdraw the privilege of attending a state
supported college from one who drives drunkenly cannot be said to in-
terfere with a substantive constitutional right. The opportunity to at-
tend a university at state expense is not, in the first instance, such a
right nor is the prerogative to drive drunkenly such a right. Condition-
ing the one upon abstaining from the other consequently is unobjec-
tionable in terms of the narrow doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
The same would be true even when we move from this less serious to
more serious examples, e.g., rules threatening to dismiss any student
who engages in any unlawful demonstration or who unlawfully dis-
turbs the peace, regardless of where the unlawful conduct takes place.
In short, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not per se
restrain a public university from indiscriminately providing that "any
student who violates any valid federal, state, or local law shall be
dismissed." 5
75See, e.g., Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D.
Fla. 1963), where the university rule leading to indefinite suspension of students
read:
Disciplinary action will be taken against students for: * * *
6. Misconduct while on or off the campus. This includes students
who may be convicted by the University officials, or city, county, or Federal
police for violation of any of the criminal and/or civil laws.
Compare Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961);
Steier v. New York State Educ. Comm'r., 271 F.2d 13, 22 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).
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The concept of equal protection, however, is not exhausted by
the doctrine of unconstitutional condition alone. 6 For the equal
protection clause does more than to restrain government from limit-
ing state supplied opportunities on various bases which are arbi-
trary solely because they would require a forfeiture of constitutional
rights. Rather, it protects equality of opportunity from arbitrary limi-
tations in general. Indeed, where the opportunity is a significant one,
a rule which would operate to forfeit that opportunity may deny
equal protection though the conduct to which it is related is other-
wise properly forbidden by general laws. For instance, what may
be a perfectly appropriate standard for purposes of determining
whether a person should be prosecuted under a state antitrust statute
may be wholly inappropriate in determining whether he should lose
his driver's license. And it will shortly be seen that even where the
reference to unlawful conduct has some relevance to a legitimate
policy involved in the granting of the privilege in question, still the
indiscriminate use of that reference may be so harsh and inessential as
to deny equal protection merely because it is comparatively, and not
absolutely, arbitrary.
B. The Broader Concept of Equal Protection.
Equal protection, as we have noted, insulates individuals from
arbitrary limitations on opportunities supplied by government as well
as from arbitrary limitations on opportunities individuals or groups are
otherwise capable of providing for themselves. By far the best known
instance of an arbitrary restriction on an opportunity supplied by
government is Brown v. Board of Educ. in which the compulsory
racial segregation of public school children was condemned.7 7 An
equally important instance is Griffin v. Illinois, holding that states
may not limit the state supplied opportunity to appeal from a criminal
conviction according to a rule requiring appellants to pay for a
transcript to be used on appeal.78 The rule was struck down in spite
of the fact that the rule had a rational connection with a legitimate
76See cases and materials cited in note 42 supra; Mr. Justice Jackson in
Railway Express Co. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949); Mr. Justice
Brandeis in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 404 (1928);
Chief Justice Taft in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331 (1921).
77347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). The opportunity to appeal a criminal conviction to a higher state court
is not guaranteed by the due process clause. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at
18, 21, 27; McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894). But see Young v.
Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 236-39 (1949); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110-
13 (1935); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923).
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interest of the state, namely, an interest in holding down the cost of
maintaining an appellate process, by requiring appellants to pay for
their own transcripts. Moreover, the rule did not operate to require
any appellant to surrender any constitutional right as a condition of
taking an appeal. The rule was deemed to deny equal protection,
therefore, not because it was "absolutely" arbitrary, (i.e., lacking any
rational connection with any legitimate purpose) but frankly because
it was "comparatively" arbitrary in the sense of being harsh and
inessential. It was harsh, because the operative effect of requiring
appellants to pay for transcripts was to withdraw from indigent defen-
dants an opportunity of great significance, namely, an opportunity to
test the legal sufficiency of their criminal conviction. It was inessen-
tial, because as the Court noted there were alternative means avail-
able to the state for economizing in the appellate process without so
severely disadvantaging indigent appellants.
We can be certain that had the rule in Griffin restricted the
opportunity to appeal not merely in the interest of holding down the
costs of maintaining an appellate process, but in the interest of
deterring certain types of criminal offenses, it would also have been
held to deny equal protection: a rule, say, which generally allowed
appeals to be taken "unless the appellant had previously been convict-
ed of tax fraud, robbery, or disturbing the peace." For admitting that
these forms of conduct are punishable, admitting that the opportunity
to appeal is just a privilege the state need not make available to
anyone, admitting that the rule may even have some deterrent effect
on these crimes, still the rule seems too arbitrary to withstand constitu-
tional challenge under the equal protection clause. It denies the
opportunity to appeal without regard to the probable merit of the
appeal or the pressing need of the defendant, and it only obliquely
serves a general law enforcement function which can be adequately
accomplished by alternative means. It is, in short, a denial of equal
protection because it is harsh, inessential, and comparatively arbi-
trary.
There emerges from Griffin and the developing line of equal
protection cases a pattern of analysis or general technique which the
Court employs to determine whether any given rule which limits the
availability of one or another opportunity denies equal protection.
Specifically, the analysis incorporates the following considerations:
1) What is the character and importance of the interests which
the state is attempting to protect or promote by the rule in question?
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2) What is the character and importance of the interests ad-
versely affected by the rule in question?
3) How substantial is the connection between the particular
basis of classification represented by the rule in question and the
legitimate purpose (s) it is designed to serve?
4) Are there available to the state alternative means of serving
those purposes adequately, without so adversely affecting the sig-
nificant interests of those who are placed at a disadvantage by the rule
in question?79
79The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available
alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in
the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of
hurt complained of and good accomplished - these are some of the
considerations that must enter into the judicial judgment.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951).
(Emphasis added.)
If the value to society of achieving the object of a particular regulation is
demonstrably outweighed by the impediment to which the regulation
subjects those whose . . . practices are curtailed by it, or if the object
sought by the regulation could with equal eflect be achieved by alternative
means which do not substantially impede those . . . practices, the regula-
tion cannot be sustained.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
Such a law, even though enacted pursuant to a valid state interest, bears a
heavy burden of justification, as we have said, and will be upheld only if it
is necessary and not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of
permissible state policy.
McLaughlin v. Florida, 85 Sup. Ct. 290-91 (1964).
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving
the same basic purpose.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
But the teaching of both Torcaso and the Sunday Law Cases is that
government may not employ religious means to serve secular interests,
however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstration
that nonreligious means will not suffice.
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 265 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, even if a compelling state interest were shown, the burden
remains on the state "* * * to demonstrate that no alternative forms of
regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment
rights."
Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405, 408 (N.D. Cal. 1964), cert. granted, 33
U.S. L. WEEK 3262 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
The measure of constitutional review, as we noted previously in notes 43
and 63 supra, is not always as severe as indicated in these cases. We are relying
upon the Court's own declared emphasis on the importance of an individual's
interest in education in suggesting that the "exceptional" standard of rigorous
review is applicable to rules which condition one's vital interest in attending a
university. See discussion in text and notes supra, notes 19-37. -
Some readers may also note that the quotations are taken from due process,
as well as from equal protection, cases. Aside from the persistent threshhold
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The explicit statement of these questions merely brings to the
surface what is otherwise implicit in the cases, namely, that whether
a given classification is "arbitrary" or "discriminatory" in a consti-
tutional sense is always a comparative or relative matter. For in-
stance, a law restricting the use of (state supplied) public school
auditoriums to those who are not "subversive elements" is not wholly
arbitrary, because it does have some tendency to serve a legitimate
interest in protecting the state from seditious or treasonous activity by
cutting down the likelihood of sedition being brought about by speak-
ers who might otherwise use such auditoriums to inspire members of
the audience to take seditious action or to enter into extremely
dangerous conspiracies. Nevertheless, the law was held by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court to deny equal protection because (a) it adversely
affected extremely significant interests in freedom of speech, (b) it
sought to accomplish its objectives by means which denied speaking
opportunities to many persons who might not, in the course of using a
school auditorium, conduct themselves in such a way as to create any
risk of seditious activity, and (c) the state had ample alternative
means of safeguarding important security interests without resorting to
this type of rule, e.g., it could adopt and enforce specific, uniform
criminal statutes to deter dangerous activity of the kind which was
only obliquely and clumsily reached by the rule in question.80 In
short, this rule, like the one in Griffin, was condemned primarily
because it too was harsh and inessential, and not because it was
literally without any rational connection to any interest within the
power of state government to protect.
It is, then, in this broader context of equal protection that we
may begin again to determine the propriety of university rules which
limit the significant interest each student has in maintaining his
association with a public university. The question may fairly be raised,
for instance, whether there is justification for a rule which threatens to
"right-privilege" distinction which tends to control the description of a case as
one of due process or one of equal protection, virtually identical considerations
frequently are employed. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See Karst, Legislative Facts in
Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUPREME COURT REv. 75.
80Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885(1946). See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937): "These
rights may be abused by using speech or press or assembly in order to incite
violence and crime. The people through their legislatures may protect them-
selves against that abuse. But the legislative intervention can find constitutionaljustification only by dealing with the abuse. The rights themselves must not be
curtailed." Buckley v. Meng, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1962), and other materials
cited supra, note 64.
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dismiss any student who parks overtime on a city street, regardless of
where the offense takes place. The answer must surely be "no." Such a
rule operates to forfeit a significant opportunity (to maintain one's
association with a university), it is not essential to protect any special
and pressing interest of the university, it at best scarcely reflects upon
the student in terms of how he uses those things the university
provides, and the city has ample means of policing downtown parking
without resort to this oblique, clumsy device gratuitously employed by
the university. The example is trivial, of course, but it may usefully be
extended to far more serious matters. (By itself, moreover, it tends to
make clear that an omnibus university rule threatening dismissal for
any violation of valid state or local laws would, under certain circum-
stances, deny equal protection). For after more than a moment's
reflection, it becomes clear that the relationship between appropriate
university rules and appropriate general laws is entirely coincidental,
i.e., the existence (or validity) of one does not establish any princi-
pled basis for the existence or enforcement of the other. Certain
conduct which violates no general statute, such as cheating on exami-
nations, is nevertheless properly forbidden by a university rule be-
cause it attempts to gain an unearned advantage over other students
who are equally entitled to a fair test of their educational achieve-
ment. Conduct which does not reflect an abuse of facilities or opportu-
nities which the university provides, however, or which is amply
policed by valid state laws whose enforcement adequately safeguards
whatever legitimate and incidental interest the university may have, is
arguably not a proper excuse for the maintenance of a university rule
enforceable by dismissal. To paraphrase the Supreme Court, "if
[students] have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or
are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they
may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation of valid law.
But it is a different matter when [a university seizes upon that
conduct to dismiss those students under rules which are both harsh
and inessential]."" Students who brawl on a Florida beach or who
participate in an unlawful downtown demonstration are subject to the
full penalty which the law may apply to that conduct. In engaging in
that conduct, however, they do not abuse any privilege extended them
by the university and a rule threatening them with dismissal is
comparatively so arbitrary that it ought to be condemned as a denial
of equal protection.
8 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1937).
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Again, even where the conduct may more directly interfere with
the university's lawful interests, a substantial issue of equal protection
arises if the punishment indiscriminately threatened by a rule properly
forbidding that conduct is unduly harsh and inessential. For instance,
smoking in the library or dormitories may appropriately be forbidden
in the interest of safety. If that interest may be amply protected by,
say, forbidding the offending student from using the library for a time
or by requiring him to find lodgings elsewhere, however, the penalty
of outright dismissal again seems harsh and inessential. Students who
hold unlawful demonstrations on the president's front lawn (to choose
Professor Hook's timely illustration) may be punished by state law
and might well, in addition, be made to forfeit certain campus social
or political advantage for a time. Again, however, it is difficult to see
the necessity for a rule carrying an automatic penalty of outright
dismissal. The denial of equal protection is not confined to cases
where the rule carries no definite penalty and where the particular
penalty imposed is manifestly disproportionate to the manner in which
the university has previously treated indistinguishable cases.8 2 It is
present in a rule which itself prescribes a harsh and inessential
penalty, to be applied indiscriminately. Indeed, it is this latter situa-
tion which is more amenable to judicial review, if only because a court
is better qualified to determine the necessity for a general classification
than to determine the appropriateness of a particular penalty selected
from a range of penalties at the discretion of university authorities.
The latter case is more likely to be reviewed only to determine
whether the student received a fair degree of procedural due process,
unless the aberrational use of an unusually severe penalty is particu-
larly gross and easy to demonstrate.
The point, then, is this. That the opportunity to maintain one's
association with a university is undoubtedly protected by the equal
protection clause. That whether particular university rules restrict that
opportunity in an arbitrary fashion which denies equal protection is a
82Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet,
if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand . . . the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition
of the Constitution.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). See also People v. Harris,
182 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (App. Dept., L.A. Supr. Ct.
1960); Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439
(1960); Wade v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d 181 (1947);
People v. Oreck, 74 Cal. App. 2d 215, 168 P.2d 186 (1946); Berger, Adminis-
trative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965);
Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws,
16 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1961).
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function of several variables. That among these are: (1) the legitima-
cy of the purpose served by the rule; (2) the relative significance of
that purpose in discharging the lawful functions of the university; (3)
the substantiality of the connection between that purpose and the
general or particular conduct forbidden by the rule; (4) the substan-
tiality of the connection between that purpose and the punishment
prescribed by the rule; (5) the relative importance to the individual
student-citizen of the activity which he is forbidden to pursue; (6) the
relative importance of the interest which will be denied him if he
violates the rule; (7) the availability of alternative means for protect-
ing the university's legitimate interests without so adversely affecting
the student's educational opportunities.
There is, in all of this, nothing esoteric and nothing which warps
or distorts contemporary concepts of equal protection in the defense of
student academic freedom. If it appears to depart from a tradition
which registered an almost sanctimonious deference to the autono-
mous authority of university faculties and admininistrators, it is only
because that tradition was itself a departure from constitutional
norms - a departure which is no longer (if it ever was) warranted.
In bringing the equal protection clause to bear in the protection of
student academic freedom, moreover, we merely reiterate a proposi-
tion which was made abundantly clear two decades ago that:
The fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, pro-
tects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures -
Boards of Education not excepted."
In calling for the "scrupulous protection" 4 of educational opportu-
nities under the equal protection clause, we do no more than to observe
that "today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments," and that it is indeed doubtful whether any
"may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education."6
Epilogue
The character of protection of student academic freedom we
have roughly outlined is essentially modest. It is modest because it
appeals to a concept of equal protection rather than to one of
substantive due process. It does not assert that any state has a
83West Virginia State Bd. of Edue. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1934).
84Ibid.
85Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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constitutional duty to establish first rate universities. It does not
prescribe the scope or character of a state university's curriculum
(beyond limiting it to permissible methods and objectives), the nature
of its auxiliary facilities, or even that free public universities shall be
established at all. Neither does it seek to elevate those who happen to
be students above their responsibilities as citizens. Most assuredly, it
does not suggest that general laws to which others are subject as
citizens are any less applicable to students as citizens.
Essentially, it merely postulates a right of equal opportunity to
pursue whatever course of study and whatever other advantages are
otherwise lawfully provided by a public university. Necessarily, it does
hold that all possessing the same qualifications are equally entitled to
those advantages, and that the determination of those qualifications
must not be made according to standards which seek to promote
purposes which are foreclosed to government. Beyond this, it also
holds that none shall subsequently be deprived of those advantages
without justification according to the considerations of equal protec-
tion we have reviewed. Subject to reasonable qualification, it suggests
that students must not be deprived of their academic freedom so long
as they pursue their studies well and so long as they respect the right
of others equally to enjoy this and all other opportunities provided by
the university. In short, it suggests that rules which are enforceable by
depriving students of their own academic freedom must find their
justification, if at all, in the mutuality of that freedom.
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